# Edward **TELLES** (UC Santa Barbara)
# Fabricio **FIALHO** (CERI, SciencesPo)

15 avril 2019, 14-16h30, salle Alfred Sauvy, INED, 133 boulevard Davout, 75020 Paris

**Title**
*Race, colorism and the State*

**Abstracts**
**Edward TELLES** (University of California, Santa Barbara), **"Global Perspectives on Skin Color Inequality and Colorism"**
A growing, interdisciplinary, and increasingly global literature concerns skin color and colorism, which are related to status throughout the world. The vast majority of research has investigated Western societies, where color and colorism have been closely related to race and racism. In Latin America, the two sets of concepts have particularly overlapped. In the rest of the world, particularly in Asia, color and colorism have also been important but have evolved separately from the relatively new concepts of race and racism. In recent years, however, color consciousness and white supremacy appear to have been increasingly united, globalized, and commodified, as exemplified by the global multibillion-dollar skin-lightening industry. My research is particularly concerned with the role of skin color in creating status hierarchies in Latin America.
See: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053315


**Fabricio M. FIALHO** (CERI/SciencesPo), **"How States Make Race: New Evidence from Brazil"**
The Brazilian state recently adopted unprecedented race-targeted affirmative action in government hiring and university admissions. Scholarship would predict the state's institutionalization of racial categories has "race-making" effects. In this article, we ask whether the Brazilian state's policy turnabout has affected racial subjectivities on the ground, specifically toward mirroring the categories used by the state. To answer, we conceptualize race as multidimensional and leverage two of its dimensions—lay identification and government classification (via open-ended and closed-ended questions, respectively)—to introduce a new metric of state race-making: a comparison of the extent of alignment between lay and government dimensions across time. Logistic regression on large-sample survey data from before the policy turn (1995) and well after its diffusion (2008) reveals an increased use of state categories as respondents' lay identification in the direction of matching respondents' government classification. We conclude that the Brazilian state is making race but not from scratch nor in ways that are fully intended.
See: https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-v5-31-722/

**Discussant**
Graziella Moraes Silva (Graduate Institute Geneva)

## Notes taken by Juliette Galonnier

**Edward TELLES, "Global Perspectives on Skin Color Inequality and Colorism"**
I took part in the project PERLA on ethnicity and race in Latin America. I was going to present on this topic but I was instructed to present another article recently published on skin color more globally.

Let us first start with a series of definitions.

"Race" generally refers to categories of people divided by physical type, based on appearance or descent and real or putative characteristics, that are named, defined, and ordered by a racial ideology originating in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; this ideology puts whites at the top of the social hierarchy and blacks and other nonwhites at the bottom.

"Skin color" generally refers to gradations of the physical characteristic of color (ordered from light to dark or white to black) that, in the Western world, are also based on ideas of race and of a racial or color hierarchy.

The idea of hierarchy is found in both race and color. And color is only one but arguably the leading indicator of race.

Now, race is clearly a Western concept but there is also a relation with Eastern conceptions of color.

In Asia, lightness/whiteness has been associated with the leisure class, but also with femininity, beauty, and purity (Hall 2010, Rondilla & Spickard 2007). There is a lot of literature on India (Vaid 2009), China (Dikötter 2015, Keevak 2011), Indonesia (Saraswati 2013, Sorokowski et al. 2013), and Japan (Arudou 2013, Wagatsuma 1967). There is also some literature on the Middle East and the history of slavery in Arab countries but it is more limited. There is almost nothing on contemporary Europe.

In Asia, studies have shown that the beauty ideal is Mixed Asian/European or "Asian beauty according to the white imagination" (Rondilla 2009). This ideal of Lightness/Whiteness is fueled by demand for Skin Lightening Products and Surgeries (e.g. Eyelids, Lips). Some authors have referred to this as "buying racial capital" (Hunter 2011).

Western conceptions of race and color are more related to one another. The origins of colorism can actually be traced to European colonization, slavery and concepts of racism. Under colonialism, whiteness and one's proximity to it in terms of ideology, culture, ancestry, and phenotype afforded greater access to social and economic privileges and opportunities.

In the United States specifically, the history of "Colorism" dates to Slavery when lighter slaves were favored for positions, manumission and as mates, creating divisions among slaves. There is now a vast literature on colorism in the United States, which is seen as separate from racism. Colorism is studied within racial categories as among African Americans and Latinos. Colorism research has been developed for many outcomes: socioeconomic status (income, education), criminal justice, dating/marriage, criminal justice, etc.

In Latin America, color research is fairly new but it shows that color is central to understanding inequality. Authors have started measuring inequality across the human spectrum rather than across racial categories as defined by the census. But Color and Race are less distinguishable in the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking world than in the English speaking countries, largely for linguistic reasons. For instance, they are interchangeable in the Cuban and Brazilian Censuses. I had a discussion on this topic with Michael Banton. He was claiming that race was the secondary process of interpretation, after color. But in Spanish, the words are used interchangeably so it is hard to determine what comes first.

On all these different topics, the Philippines is an interesting case in point. With Spanish colonization, ideas of Castas and Color Hierarchies have been introduced in the country. Then, with US Colonization, Jim Crow Racism and Racial Categorization also had an impact on society. In the contemporary period, the country is influenced by East Asian ideas of Colorism and ideas of race brought by a Global Filipino Diaspora. All these different ideas come together in the Philippines which offers a good case to explore these things.

The skin bleaching/whitening industry has become a multi-billion dollar industry. It has increasingly globalized, commodified and united Color Consciousness, by shaping a preference for Lightness/Whiteness and White Supremacy. This is best exemplified in products such as "Fair and Lovely" and recently in the case of Sammy Sosa, a Dominican football player who used these products.

In some parts of Asia, 60 to 70% of the women have used these products. In some parts of Africa, it is 40%.

What about tanning?, one may ask. Slight darkening through tanning may benefit persons of European descent; In the U.S., it has become a sign of leisure among white women since 1920s and it has more recently been associated with attractiveness for men. Among medieval European men, light skin was associated with attractiveness but a tanned look implied manliness and courage (Frost 1990).
However, being tanned has proven a historical disadvantage in East Asian societies and evidence suggests this may still be the case.

When discussing race and color, the idea of measurement is central and it has been a central preoccupation in the literature. This is an important question: how do we measure skin color? With regards to race, the traditional way is to ask people to categorize themselves. For skin color, different options have been explored:
- Self-Classification: the first one is self-classification. Are you dark, medium or light skin?
- Interviewer-classification: sometimes, it is the interviewer who classifies.
- Skin Color Scales (Interviewer vs Self Rating): we can also use a color scale, like we did in PERLA.
- Spectrophotometer

These techniques raise different questions:
What part of the body should we measure? The face, the wrist? What part is socially relevant?
Interviewer Bias? The National Survey of Black Americans showed that there was a strong interviewer effect on the measurement of color.
There might also be a Systematic Bias linked to cognitive stereotypes. For instance, a student of mine recently conducted a computer survey showing participants randomly allocated pictures of Mexican origin women with different first names. They showed that people rated the Marys lighter than the Marias.

Let me now talk about color in Latin America and the PERLA study.
This was a Multiple Country Study: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
We had a research team from multiple countries as well. It was also multidisciplinary. Our objective was to Study Ethnicity and Race in Latin America including Inequality, Stratification, Racial Attitudes, Discrimination through National Random-Sample Surveys. We had initially given little thought to color but it turned out to be much more important than we thought it would. Color became a central dimension in the study, which led to a book entitled *Pigmentocracies*.

Latin America has long been characterized by the myth of *mestizaje* (race mixture). Latin American populations generally span wide color/racial variation as a result of widespread mixing over centuries among Africans, Europeans and Indigenous. Nationalizing elites promoted mestizaje narratives as central to national identity, often downplaying or ignoring Africans (except Brazil, Cuba and Puerto Rico): the emphasis was rather on mixing between the European and indigenous parts of the population. A good example of this is the Dominican republic, which fora long time put the emphasis on the Taino and European origins, adding a strong focus on Catholicism as a cement of national identity.

Latin America actually had a lot more mixture than other colonial contexts. Actual mestizaje among Afrodescendants, Indigenous and Europeans was facilitated by the demographic imbalance of colonizers (there were very few white European women). In the US, on the contrary, colonization was done by European families. Among Latin American elites, Mestizaje narratives used to deny racism became widely accepted (e.g. racial democracy, colorblindness). This was especially strong in Brazil and Mexico, where the narrative was "we are not racist like the US". The Mixed race/mestizo became a national prototype and a widely accepted prototype. It is true that there had been no legal racial segregation (except PR, Cuba and Panama), no anti-miscegenation laws and no classification laws since Independence. Racial Classification was more appearance-based, fluid and customary, with a lot of mixed race categories: it was not legal- or descent-based, and class was commonly thought to be primary social cleavage. However, in spite of all this, and like in the U.S., racial discrimination and inequality remains pronounced throughout the region.

As a reminder, this is the number of Africans who were enslaves and disembarked over the period 1514-1866, by region:
Brazil:  4,864,000
British Caribbean: 2,318,000
Spanish Americas: 1,293,000
French Caribbean: 1,120,000
Dutch America: 445,000
Mainland North America (U.S.): 389,000
Other:  274,000
TOTAL: 9,405,000
Source: Eltis, Slave Voyages Database 2014

And this is the number and percentage of Afrodescendants in Latin American countries

## AFRODESCENDANT AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS (IN 1000S) AND PERCENTAGES IN LATIN AMERICA BY COUNTRY

| Countries | Year | Afro-origin Population | Percentage | Year | Indigenous Population | Percentage | Population |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 2010 | 150 | 0.4 | 2010 | 955 | 2.4 | 40,117 |
| Bolivia | 2012 | 24 | 0.2 | 2012 | 4,068 | 40.6 | 10,027 |
| Brazil | 2010 | 97,083 | 50.9 | 2010 | 897 | 0.5 | 190,733 |
| Chile | 2012 | 97 | 0.6 | 2012 | 1,700 | 10.2 | 16,636 |
| Colombia | 2005 | 4,274 | 10.3 | 2005 | 1,393 | 3.4 | 41,468 |
| Costa Rica | 2011 | 334 | 7.8 | 2011 | 104 | 2.4 | 4,302 |
| Cuba | 2012 | 3,885 | 34.8 | 2012 | – | – | 11,163 |
| Dominican Republic | 2010 | A) 2,267 B) 8,046 | A) 24.0 B) 89.0 | 2010 | – | – | 9,445 |
| Ecuador | 2010 | 1,043 | 7.2 | 2010 | 1,014 | 7.0 | 14,484 |
| El Salvador | 2007 | 7 | 0.1 | 2007 | 13 | 0.2 | 5,744 |
| Guatemala | 2011 | 5 | 0.0 | 2011 | 4,428 | 30.1 | 14,713 |
| Honduras | 2011 | 59 | 0.7 | 2001 | 428 | 5.1 | 8,448 |
| Mexico | 2010 | 2,366 | 2.1 | 2010 | 15,700 | 14.0 | 112,337 |
| Nicaragua | 2005 | 23 | 0.4 | 2005 | 444 | 8.6 | 5,142 |
| Panama | 2010 | 313 | 9.1 | 2010 | 418 | 12.1 | 3,454 |
| Paraguay | 2012 | 234 | 3.5 | 2012 | 116 | 1.7 | 6,673 |
| Peru | 2007 | 411 | 1.5 | 2007 | 7,600 | 27.0 | 27,412 |
| Uruguay | 2011 | 255 | 7.8 | 2011 | 159 | 4.8 | 3,286 |
| Venezuela | 2011 | A) 953 B) 14,534 | A) 3.5 B) 53.4 | 2011 | 953 | 3.5 | 27,228 |
| TOTAL | | A) 113,783 B) 136,726 | A) 20.6 B) 24.7 | | 40,390 | 7.3 | 553,661 |

In contemporary research on race and skin color, we encounter issues of measurement inconsistencies. Racial classification in Censuses and surveys is measured in multiple ways and it depends on the questions and categories used and whether respondents or interviewers do the classifying. In Latin America specifically, questions arise as to how to measure mixed-race. This has implications for measuring the Size and Status of Ethnoracial Groups. We decided to use several measures of race and ethnicity in the four countries we studied. We showed that measurements have an effect on the size of the population we end up finding. The Afro-Brazilian population for instance can vary from 6 to 60% depending on the question you use.

We encounter the same problem when measuring the indigenous population. Percentages vary depending on how the question is framed.

| Percent Size of Indigenous Population in Mexico and Peru using Alternative Measures | | |
|---|---|---|
| | MEXICO | PERU |
| A. Self-Identification in an Indigenous Ethnic Group [1] | 22.2 | 23.5 |
| B. Self-Identification as "Indigenous" using five mutually-exclusive categories[2] | 12.4 | 4.7 |
| C. Speaking Fluency in Indigenous Language | 16.2 | 23.4 |
| D. Interviewer Classification as Indigenous using AB format | 8.8 | 6.3 |
| E. Indigenous First Language | 12.5 | 11.4 |
| F. Some ability to understand Indigenous language | 20.9 | 42.5 |
| G. Indigenous mother[3] | 16.7 | 31.7 |
| H. Indigenous father[3] | 16.5 | 29 |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| I. Mother Speaks/Spoke Indigenous Language | 15.2 | 38.4 |
| J. Father Speaks/Spoke Indigenous Language | 16.1 | 36.8 |
| K. At least one parent Speaks/Spoke Indigenous Language | 18.2 | 42.7 |
| L. At least one Grandparent Speaks/Spoke Indigenous Language | 27.6 | 49.8 |
| Source: 2010 PERLA Nationally Representative Sample Surveys of Mexico and Peru | | |

So everything depends on who does the categorization. But it is important to note that discrimination happens depending on how people see you and not necessarily on how you see yourself. So self-identification might not always be the best option.

Ethnoracial Census classification is new for most countries in the region. In the 1990s, many countries were collecting data on race and ethnicity for the first time. By 2010, more than half of Latin American countries collect data on race and ethnicity. Official measures of race and ethnicity are difficult to achieve because race and ethnicity are ambiguous and fluid. They are based on Self-Identification, which is situational, relational and subject to personal experiences/ideologies/status. Categories (like Mestizo) may be highly heterogeneous.

Skin color is the top criteria for classifying by race. Everybody says they are "mestizo" but then we notice fine-grained distinctions among people who claim they are mestizo (depending on whether they are light or dark-skinned). Classification is outward appearance based but it is rarely named and recognized. Color enables us to capture continuous and fine-grained distinctions, across and within Census ethnoracial categories, especially capacious ones like "Mestizo". In PERLA, it was measured using a Color Palette

What difference does it make to examine racial inequality based on skin color, compared to census ethno-racial classifications? We show that using the census categories, you might not be able to get a clear picture of inequality. When using color, when breaking down the population by color categories, we actually capture racial hierarchies much better: a clearer racial hierarchy emerges.

The examination of Educational Inequality using both Ethnoracial Categories and Skin Color gives clear results:

YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND ETHNORACIAL IDENTIFICATION



YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND SKIN COLOR

Skin color turns out to be a much better indicator of inequality than expected. Ethnoracial Identification is less consistent/robust than Skin Color for Afrodescendants. We have to keep in mind that the census is a snapshot and may not fully reflect the reality. Categories are

embedded with different meanings across countries. For instance, Blacks and Mulatos have particularly low status in Brazil. But in the Dominican Republic, (and in Colombia) Mulatos have particularly high status. This is because for a long time Dominicans resisted the Black and Mulato categories, because they were associated with Haitians. But in the recent period, more educated people have started to recognize and embrace these categories. So there is a selectivity bias in census categories.

Color, which is based on outward appearance and fine distinctions, better captures black disadvantage and white advantage because it better reflects racial discrimination, which is based on treatment (by others). Regressions with controls for demographic variables also support bivariate findings and show the importance of Class Origins.

**Fabricio M. FIALHO, "How States Make Race: New Evidence from Brazil"**

In this presentation, I will talk about an [article ](#)that I recently published along with Stan Bailey and Mara Loveman. In this article, our focus was an understanding of the recent changes in how Brazilians classify themselves racially in every kind of situation. How do they see each other in everyday settings? Which terms do they use usually? What is the difference between folk categorizations and official/institutional classifications?

Individuals use dozen of different terms to express subtle phenotypical differences, perceived class status, gender, etc. (some terms are not used to talk about women for instance).

In this paper, we document a decline in the use of lay terms. When asked about their race, people can use lay or official terms. Between 1994 and today, we see a decline in the use of lay terms and an increase in official terms. This is what we refer to as "dimension alignment", that is a convergence between lay and official usages.

This convergence is the result of recent changes in public/official discourse about race in the country. We argue that race-targeted affirmative action policies are having race-making effects but the results of this shift are unexpected.

Race-making and the State
The state plays a major role in the construction of racial cleavages (Bourdieu 1985; Jenkins 1994; Omi and Winant 1994; Marx 1997). Census, ID cards, policies, etc. have an impact on how people classify themselves. The bureaucratization and the institutionalization of race can be either weak or strong, with different shades of grey.

When institutionnalization of race is weak, there are official categories and information about race is collected, but it is considered irrelevant to most individuals. For instance, the census takes place once every 10 year, it provides aggregated analysis, it is not

targeted at individuals. Being categorized in group A, B or C has no direct impact on one's life chances.

But institutionnalization may be strong when States use data on race to create policies and allocate resources. Data is used to inform eligibility for policies, official segregation laws, etc. The enforcement of racial categories may be used for positive or negative issues. Being a member of a group or not has an impact.

In this paper, we show that state institutionnalization can act as a switching mechanism that creates an increased salience of a particular social boundary. There is strong institutionnalization when:
- group boundaries are made clear and reinforced
- group memberships have to be clear for policy implementation
- there is a politicization of group boundaries  (Simon and Klandermans, 2001) and group membership is incorporated into the self concept (Huxley 2013; McClain et al. 2009)

Racial classification in Brazil has always been a complex issue. There are two major modes of classification:
- the official, government system of classification
- the popular, lay folk system

Government classification

Since the 1872 census, the government collects data on race. We have a more than a 100-year time series of race data. (there was only one instance in which race was not collected, in 1970, during military rule, to avoid divisive issues). Since 1950, there are four categories in the census:
- Branco (white)
- Pardo (brownish)
- Preto (black)
- Amarelo ("yellow", for Asians)
Since 1991, the category "indigeno" has been added.

These categories are used in different official documents besides the census, such as birth certificates. But they have very low penetration in everyday life and practices. Until the early 2000s, there was no policy use for these classifications. This changed with the Cardoso administration (1995-2003): for the first time, the State acknowledged racial discrimination and worked in alliance with the Black movement to design new policies. This also took place in the context of the 2001 UN Conference in Durban. This collaboration gave momentum to the discussion of national-level policies. In 2001, a new law implementing quotas in public universities was passed. All universities were required to implement some type of affirmative action. In 2003, the Secretariat for the promotion of racial equality (Secretaria Nacional de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial, SEPPIR) was created. It had the same status as a

Ministry. In 2004, the Federal government passed a law implementing affirmative action at federally-funded universities.

Because of these new laws, being classified as a member of one group or another had an impact on policy eligibility for the quota system. Quotas were implemented for pretos, pardos and negros (not for indigenous peoples). These were the first race-targeted policies to be implemented since 1888.

The Brazilian Black movement had an influence on the government policy. They endorsed and pushed for a binary system of classification: Branco vs. Negro. "Negro", which is an un-official term (not used in the census) has become embedded in the language of the law, in the university policies. This has given rise to a third type of classification:
1) Lay: huge spread of terms and expressions
2) Official: branco, pardo, preto
3) Black movement: branco, negro

This third type has become embedded in policy. The Black movement has made this binary system of classification salient, without using the official terms.

If we look at lay forms of classification, what we may call "street-level classification", we notice a multiplicity of terms. This is apparent in the PNAD, a national household survey that was conducted in 1976. This survey is famous because it included for the first time an open question about racial classification. More than 130 terms were registered in that survey. But six major terms covered 95% of the responses (see Telles 2004)
- Branco (white)
- Pardo (brown)
- Preto (black color)
- Negro (black race)
- Moreno (brown color), which was the most widely used term (associated with mestizaje)
- Moreno claro (light moreno)

Moreno is a highly ambiguous term, that tends to downplay racial differences to promote the myth of racial democracy ("there is no racism because everybody is in the middle). There is only a partial overlap between census categories and skin color classifications.

FIGURE 4.3 Use of Brazilian racial categories along the color continuum

Source: Edward Telles, 2004, *Race in Another America, p. 84*

The question we ask in this paper is: is the change in the way the Brazilian State has treated race a possible switching mechanism in the way people classify themselves racially? Have Brazilians increased the use of official categories?

We analyzed data from the *Racismo Cordial* survey that was conducted in 1995 and 2008 and which gives us a 20-year window to see how daily classification has evolved. This survey is unique to test the way Brazilians classify themselves because it asks two questions:
- one open-ended question
- one close question using the official census categories

We can therefore compare the two. We coded the responses, using 1 when there was congruency between official and lay categories and 0 when there was no congruency. We ran logistic regression models.

We show that over the period 1995-2008, there was a decline by more than 10% in those who classify themselves as branco. There was a big increase in the use of the term pardo in the lay open question and a big decline in the use of moreno. The use of preto did not evolve very much: it remained unpopular before and after the introduction of the policies.

**Figure 1:** Racial composition by government classification, 1995 and 2008.

**Figure 2:** Racial composition by lay identification, 1995 and 2008.

We also performed cross tabulations. They show that the percentage of the population that self-classified as branco for both their government classification (closed-format question) and their lay identification (open-ended question) is high overall; in addition, it increased by about 10 percent from 1995 to 2008 (from 73 percent to 83 percent, respectively).

### A. Branco



### B. Pardo



### C. Preto



**Figure 3:** Government classification by lay identification, 1995 and 2008.

We also see that pardo is being increasingly incorporated in the popular lexicon of racial classification. We also notice a 100% increase among census pretos in the use of the term "negro" to self-identify.

The regression shows that holding everything else constant, brancos tend to align themselves more with census categories.

From 1995 to 2008, there was also a stronger alignment growth among pardos than among brancos.

Having college education has a strong negative effect on using "preto" in the open-ended question.

We also notice a generational change: older pretos call themselves pretos more often than younger pretos, who prefer to use the word "negro".

The more educated people are, the more they absorb the official categories in their lives, except among pretos: the more educated people are, the less they use the word preto to self-identify. Census preto respondents are increasingly adopting the term negro to identify themselves.

This shows that the change is official categories has mostly been absorbed by the younger people. The older ones tend to stick to the older categories.

When States use racial categories and link their use to the distribution of symbolic or material opportunities or resources, the salience of the boundaries that mirror state categories increase.

We notice different phenomena:
- a constriction of the branco category, which indicates a purification of the white category
- the growth of pardo and preto categories
- but pretos are increasingly embracing the non-official category "negro". Preto is a highly derogatory term in Brazil and negro has been used as a destigmatizing word.

In conclusion, we can say that the Brazilian state is *Making Race* because it is making the boundaries clearer. But the Brazilian population is adopting a new tripartite system of classification that neither matches the government classification nor the Black movement's. People use:
- branco
- pardo
- negro

But pardos do not identify as negro like the Black movement would like.

**Graziella Moraes Silva, discussant**
These presentations raise a number of interesting questions.

The first one is directed to Edward Telles: how to understand color? Is it a proxy to race? There are 3 ways to think about the relations between race and color:
- The Eastern world way: color and race are separated
- Color is one element of race
- Color is a more objective way to see race and racial inequality

There is something that makes me a little bit uncomfortable with this last idea. Are we really talking about color or about the perceptions that people have about color? Exactly the same skin tone can have very different effects in Brazil, South Africa or Switzerland. I do not think that color can be seen as a "more objective" conception of race. I am afraid that we will end up pushing too hard this objective vision of race and going back to 1920s types of experiments. These debates on objective measures of race, in my opinion, eludes the most important question: how does skin color relate differently to how people think about race in different contexts?

On colorism, race, and skin color: is it possible to talk about colorism without using the language of race? Can we think of an anti-colorism policy that does not rely on the language of race?

Then, regarding Fabricio Fialho's paper, I will retain three main conclusions:
- States cannot make race alone (they need social movements)

- States do not make race from scratch
- The effects of race-making are not always intended

I wonder however what "intended" means in this case. Is the State trying to create identities or to redress inequalities?

I also think that "Negro" is a more official term than suggested: it is already used in a lot of State agencies and State documents.

You mentioned that "boundaries are becoming brighter because of State policies". This echoes Stan Bailey's previous work, which relies on the assumption that people are strategic: their identity depends on the benefits they can get from it. But I believe there is also a transnational aspect to it. There can be new repertoires that are made available to people independently from strategical or instrumental uses.

There have been tensions and complications around the "pardo" category (for university verification commissions, saying that one is "pardo" is not enough to claim access to the quotas). The backlash against this category might also explain why people do not identify with it anymore.

> => Answer by Edward Telles: in this work, we always conceive of color as relational. It is not essentialized in any sense. The good thing is that there is increasing interest for this line of research: so people are going to measure color in different ways and we will have more information about it.
> Eastern conceptions of colorism are an example of colorism that does not rely on the language of race. In the United States, there is an anti-racist movement but there is no anti-colorist movement. Resisting colorism is very hard because it is much more insidious. For a long time, it was a taboo subject.

> => Answer by Fabricio Fialho: there is an alignment around the term Negro. The word has circulated, it has been around and yes, it is increasingly used in the terminology of official reports. But this alignment happens only among 10% of those who should classify as Negros within the binary system promoted by the Black movement. There are cases of pardos adopting the term Negro, with the idea that Negro conveys a more political identity, in a sense. The increase in the use of Negro reflects an increase in political consciousness. Still, 85% of people who could identify as Negro according to the Black movement do not use the term.
> The State wants to redress racial inequalities. But for the Black movement, it is more about creating new identities. If we are concerned about the intention of the Black movement, then that goal has not been achieved.
> Overall, we need more data to see how the backlash against the pardo category in university commissions has impacted the debates. But this is not a national issue, since the verification commissions are very localized. We do not know yet how this backlash will affect the use of the term.

**Questions from the audience**

<u>Katerina Chatzikidi</u>
The conclusion of the PERLA study is that color better captures racial inequality than other measures. How does that relate to the Brazilian census where color has always been a very important category in the census? We could say that the relevance of the color spectrum is in a way denied by the Black movement. What is the effectiveness in addressing racial discrimination?

> => Answer by Edward Telles : Graziella Moraes Silva was the head of the Brazilian team on PERLA and she will correct me if I am wrong but it appeared that race and color were more consistent in Brazil than anywhere else. To understand the binary vs. tertiary system of classification, you have to look back at a study conducted by Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva. The Black movement relied a lot on their data. They used the 1970 PNAD survey to show the differences between whites and non-whites. They demonstrated that there were no statistically significant differences between pardos and pretos. Yet, since then, studies have highlighted differences between these two groups. But the Black movement has continued to endorse a binary vision of race.

<u>Daniel Sabbagh</u>
You contrasted color-related figures with race-related figures as measured by the census and you argue that the first ones are more relevant to address inequality. But the next step would be to compare self-identified race categories and other-identified race categories (for example from a visual survey where strangers are asked to identify people). Is there available data to do that? This might help us assess the comparative advantage of color per se, as opposed to the comparative advantage of not relying on self-identification to measure racial inequality.

> => Answer by Edward Telles: We have data on different ways of classifying race. Color ended up being so neat in creating race hierarchies that we had to include it in the survey. So far I have only played with the data but I haven't published on this. We need to have evidence about color hierarchies from other countries. My focus was on Latin America because the history is very specific there. But we lack studies in different countries.
> => Answer by Graziella Moraes Silva: what we measured in PERLA is not actual skin color but the perception of it by national interviewers. We need to insist that color is not a universal metric that can be applied anywhere.

<u>Patrick Simon</u>
At the 2019 Population Association of America (PAA) conference, there was a [paper ](#)by Mary E. Campbell and Verna Keith, entitled "Measuring Skin Tone: A Test of Common Approaches". They tested different kinds of color measurement (the usual scale, a 10-point scale, and a more complex device with 64 shades). They concluded that the usual traditional old-school scale was doing the trick and that the improvement of measurement was not in itself necessary.

> => Answer by Fabricio Fialho: How do the colors from the palette overlap with crispy categories? There is actually a lot of overlap of color among different categories.

A survey such as *Racismo cordial* might not be the best way to capture street-level perceptions of race. Maybe direct observations on the street could be more productive.

> => Answer by Fabricio Fialho: It is true that when people answer a survey, they think differently about themselves. And it is not certain that an open question in a survey actually captures lay representations. But the good thing about this survey is that the open question always came first, so it was not contaminated by what the person would say in the close-ended question. This refers to racial cognition debates. The work of Stan Bailey has clearly shown that if you first ask people about affirmative action and then about racial categories, you get very different results than when you do not ask them about affirmative action.

You are saying that "the State is making the categorization brighter". It seems to imply a form of nostalgia for a period when race was less salient. Yet, the assumption that race was not important is in fact a rhetorical colorblind discourse that was never reflected in reality. And when we challenge this discourse, we are accused of reinforcing boundaries. The truth is that it was already there before. You take affirmative action as a trigger for racial alignment but I would say that the direction of causality is reverse.

Regarding the decline in the white category, to what extent is it due to people switching racial categories and to what extent is it due to an actual demographic change?

> => Answer by Fabricio Fialho: Maybe. Another question is: Is the purification of whiteness an effect of the Black movement mobilization? The Black movement wanted to incite the pardos to call themselves Black. But most pardos reject this category. Only 3% of census pardos are self-declaring Negros. The Black movement has not been successful in capturing that public. There is however a clear decline in people who identify as Morenos. The understanding of what pardo means is becoming clearer to the public. What is interesting in our study is that without offering census categories, respondents still tend to see themselves increasingly in terms of census categories. But for Blacks, there is an alignment not with the census categories, but with what the Black movement expects them to do.